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POLICE, PEOPLE, AND PROTEST 
I 
The Muslim League's incapacity to control the police force and its eventual dependence 
on them as the mainstay of state power introduced tensions into the League itself; in 
addition, it directly contributed to certain developments in the realm of politics. I also 
intend to highlight in this chapter instances where the police could not be controlled by 
civil bureaucrats and magistrates. Much of the erosion of the legitimacy of the Muslim 
League rule in East Pakistan was caused by the brutality, unlicensed tyranny, and 
corruption of the police. 
The press and the members of the Opposition in the East Bengal Legislative Assembly 
on many occasions exposed police atrocities on the population in a language that quite 
often verged on sentimentality. The Muslim League leadership in government explained 
police atrocities in terms of inexperience and indiscipline of the force. But people refused 
to see the regime as something different in intent and purpose from the police actions . 
Indeed, people's interpretation of 'political independence' did not fit well with what the ' 
police called 'law and order', and as a result a number of serious clashes occured. 
Police power was liberally employed to sustain the Muslim League rule; as a result 'police 
excesses' occurred at a regular rate. In a propaganda tract on the six years of Muslim 
League rule in East Pakistan that the United Front circulated at the time of the March 
1954 election , cases of police atrocities featured prominently and the League was 
called a 'Murderer' .1 It was, in fact, the Front's pledge to limit police power that inspired 
the people to vote for the United Front in the first general election in the province. 
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East Pakistan police numbered 1083 officers and 12935 men during 1948.2 According to 
a report by the Inspector-General of Police, the department started with a shortage of 
2,500 constables.3 In 'a year of unprecedented stress and strain' the motussil police, 
with its strength and equipment based on a condition that obtained half a century ago, 
was entrusted to tackle the problem that multiplied manifold due to the partition of the 
province. The police force, the officers complained, was pitifully small in 1948 compared 
to the population and the area of the country. There was one policeman for every 3.4 
square miles and for every 2700 people; But even this represented a substantial 
increase in the intensity of policing of the society over the previous hundred years when 
in 1837 there was one policeman to every 15 square miles and to 3,900 people.4 Still 
policing was scanty, according to the Inspector-General of Police in 1948,who suggested 
'enlargement of strength and equipment of the Forces' .5 
There were altogether 428 police stations in the province of which 184 were without 
telegraph offices within easy reach. Most of the province was criss-crossed with rivers, 
and the only means of transport was provided by the slow-moving country boats. Ninety 
seven vehicles including motorcycles, of which four had been condemned, twenty eight 
steam and motor launches, sixteen wireless stations, most of which were closed down for 
lack of staff, constituted the infrastructure of the police department in August 1947.6 
Due to the partition of the Province, the district forces were to a large extent disorganised. 
According to the Inspector-General of Police 'a heavy strain was placed on the police in 
connection with border troubles which were frequent. They were also called upon to 
guard the railway lines in connection with threatened strike and sabotage'. 7 Eighty one 
border outposts were created as a temporary measure to deal with border troubles.8 
The belief that a decisive use of force was beneficial for the general maintenance of state 
power was colonial in origin, and behind this belief lay a persistent fear that unless the 
government intervened promptly and forcefully to suppress even minor outbreaks of 
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violence its authority could suffer.9 The outlook continued to influence the police and the 
leaders of the Muslim League. Indeed, the police emerged as the biggest single 
instrument used by the ruling party in dealing with the unsettled conditions created by the 
partition. 'Strengthening the Police force', the Prime Minister stated, 'was an imperative 
necessity' .1 0 As early as February 1948 the Inspector-General of Police suggested an 
immediate increase in the strength of the force 'in view of the vastly changed 
circumstances'. Disturbed border conditions, the influx of large number of refugees and 
the concomitant rehabilitation of them, and the general and considerable increase in 
crime were put forward as reasons to justify enlargement of the force.11 The Police 
. Committee·that was announced on 23 August 1949 to look into the police requirements of 
the province found the force inadequate. After giving their 'anxious consideration' to the 
question, the committee concluded that an increase of the size of the constabulary was 
'absolutely necessary' .12 As a result, the force was 'enlarged in size'. In 1952 the 
number of constables reached 18413. By June 1954, the strength of the total force 
reached close to 40,000.13 
The increased spending on the police force put pressure on the 'sick' economy of the 
provinces. The Prime Minister admitted in the Assembly that 'there [had] been a very big 
increase·in the police budget' and a large proportion of East Pakistan's revenue now went 
to the Police Department. Not only were the local critics of the gov~mment unhappy 
about the expenditure on the police, the Central Government, according to the Prime 
Minister, 'pointed its finger at the Police budget'. The Central Government, in fact, was 
'very bitter that such a large percentage o.f the revenue should. go for the Police 
budget'.14 
The sudden and very large expansion of the force also contributed to the lowering of its 
efficiency and discipline.15 Quick promotion for officers resulted in a fall in the quality of 
supervision.16 The Police Committee recognised that the greatest problem regarding 
improvement of the force involved the subordinate ranks; their knowledge, manners, 
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bearing and efficiency were not deemed satisfactory for the policing of 'a democratic 
society'.17 
To aid the police in rural areas chowkidars and datadars 'existed in one form or another' 
under the Bengal Village Self Government Act of 1919. The total number of dafadars and 
chowkidars employed in 1948 was 49,649. The number, however, fell to 40,051 in 1953. 
The Police Committee also recorded that 'the quality of the work of chowkidars' had 
deteriorated over the preceding two decades. The police authorities became sceptical 
about the efficiency of the rural police in their dealings with 'suspects' and 'proclaimed 
offenders'. 
A conference of the Deputy Inspectors-General of Police with the lnspector•General held 
at Dhaka on 10 .and 11 November 1947 unanimously concluded that 'a volunteer force' 
should have been raised to assist the police in the situation that·obtained in the. province 
immediately after the attainment of political independence. It was also resolved that each 
union would have had its own force. The Chief Secretary of the East Bengal Government 
also suggested that 150,000 men from the province be recruited to form what would be 
cafled the ansar organization. Of them 15,000 were to be trained in the use of arms. It 
was suggested that they could be recruited from the. 200,000 or so Muslim League 
National Guards, a body already in existence in the province.18 
In 1948, the East Bengal Legislative Assembly passed the ansars Act 'to mobilize the 
resources of [the] Province to ensure the safety of the State and to prepare for the great 
task of social and economic reconstruction. •19 The ansars acted as auxiliary police and 
sometimes as an auxiliary defence force. Towards the end of September 1948 the 
activities of the ansars organisation received a further boost as a result of the decision of 
. · .,,tf:le,government to recruit into the .organisation as many able~bodied citizens of Eastern 
Pakistan as possible.20 It was also decided that 1 ,000 ansars for each sub-division 
would receive musketry training. By November 1948 about 70,000 ansarswere recruited 
and 52,391 members of the ansars were trained in the use of fire-anns by January 
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1949.21 In presenting the Budget for 1951-52, the Finance Minister told the Parliament 
that the ansar organisation had justified its existence by providing an auxiliary Police 
Force for discharging police functions by rendering useful services to the State and the 
people.22 
The ansar activities were almost entirely controlled by a Deputy Inspector-General of 
Police and all the resources of the Police Department, including instructors and arms 
were made available to this organisation. Thus the Muslim League volunteers created 
and raised during the last days of the Raj to serve the community were disbanded and 
many of them were absorbed into the agencies of the State. Instead of the Party 
controlling the ansars, the latter were now being controlled by the police. The State 
created and maintained the ansars at a very low cost. Indeed, the per-capita cost of 
maintaining and strengthening all the forces related to law and order was not much. 'East 
Bengal Police', commented the Inspector-General of Police ·in 1948, 'was perhaps the 
cheapest in the world; the housing and clothing of the force left a great deal to be desired; 
the pay and emoluments did not increase commensurate with the increase in the cost of 
living'. The main basis for fixing the pay appeared to have been the standard of living of 
an average man of the strata of the society from which the constables were drawn.23 As 
far as the constables were concerned the pay seemed to have been fixed in the past on 
the basis that they could be classed as unskilled labourers, and with reference to what 
men of that class (from which the constables were dra~n) generally earned in normal 
conditions. 
The Police Committee observed that the pay of the lower police was inadequate but they 
did not recommend a rise in their pay; instead, the committee expected that the 
government would bring down the cost of living.24 This was a task that proved 
impossible for the Muslim League government to achieve. Obviously, the poorer sections 
of the police were left to live off the people. This attitude of the government was much 
resented by the police themselves. In a leaflet issued by some constables listing a set of 
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demands, they alleged that the Ministers of the Government did not think it necessary to 
increase their pay for they believed that the police were all corrupt.25 
To assume that all the members of the force enjoyed this predatory life imposed on them 
by the State system would be to overlook their struggle to reform the latter. The lower 
police of Dhaka staged a strike in 1948 for higher pay and better amenities. The military 
intervened and killed four of them and injured several.26 Policemen were also at times 
affected by the issues that agitated the East Bengali community. Thus, while it is true 
that on 21 February 1952, the day of the language riot in Dhaka the police did fire on the 
crowd, it is also well known that many members of the force had sympathy for this 
movement aimed at securing for the Bengali language recognition as one of the state 
languages of Pakistan. Tajuddin Ahmed mentioned in his diary on 1 March 1952, while 
he was travelling in a train, he overheard a group of armed police headed by a havildar 
expressing support for the State Language Movement.27 Isolated instances of such kind 
were definitely there. But the force, along with its auxiliaries were in the main disliked by 
the people. As we shall see, there were reasons for this antipathy. 
m 
Often the behaviour of the police towards the people was as oppressive as it had been 
during the colonial period. To many a policeman political independence meant the 
beginning of a 'police Raj' - 'a. regime in which the police occupied a crucial position in the 
ordering of rural and urban society, in the suppression of political opposition and in the 
maintenance of State and class control'.28 
Of all the tyrannies of the police the worst was the indiscriminate use of firearms on flimsy 
grounds: from September 1947 till the end of August 1948 - within a year of 
independence - on no less than 58 occasions the police fired on people. On 2 September 
1948, the Acting Inspector-General of Police, in a memorandum to all All Range Deputy 
Inspectors General of Police, found it necessary to point out to the Superintendents of 
Police that the 'police should not resort to firing until there [was} ample justification for 
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using it'. 29 This memorandum seemed to have had very little effect on the trigger-happy 
force. In 1949 the police fired on people on 90 occasions all over the province. 
According to the Inspector-General of Police, in the majority of cases the police had to 
I 
shoot in self-defence.30 In the Police Order No. 1 of 1949, issued by the Inspector-
General of Police on 21 April 1949, it was noted that 'in recent months ... there has been 
an unfortunate increase in the cases of firing by the police'. The Inspector-General urged 
the Superintendents of Police to explain his instructions at muster parades at 
headquarters frequently in order that the subordinate. police understood fully the 
implications of the use of force by them on members of the public.31 Obviously, the 
highest police bureaucrat realized that the lower ranks failed to understand the implication 
of using violent methods on the people while carrying out official instructions. As a result 
of this diagnosis, which had actually been made nearly a year before this order was 
issued, all the armed constables had to go through a 'short period of intensive refresher 
course' within three months of August 1948 in order to remedy this unsatisfactory state of 
affairs.32 However, the situation at best remained unchanged, if it did not actually 
worsen. The following table gives an idea about the· frequency of police violence on the 
people of East Bengal during the early years of political independence. 
In 1952 and 1953there were 37 and 48 cases of use of fire arms by the PoJice.33 
The police, in fact, continued to abuse authority, to intensify tyranny, to violate customary 
rights, to interfere in the matters of civil disputes, and to thwart the people's desire to 
participate in nation-building activities. In order to gain a better understanding of police 
excesses a number of incidents where police used firearms and killed people, are 
outlined below. 
One such incident occurred in Gazaria bee/ of Manikganj police station in Dhaka district 
on 18 December 1948. According to the Secretary of the Manikganj branch of the Muslim 
League it was an 'unjustified firing on unarmed peaceful public by Manikganj police ... 
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TABLE 7.1 
District-wise breakdown of use of firearms by the Police in the Province of East Bengal, for the 
years 1948-1951 
District 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Dacca 11 4 6 5 
Faridpur 2 5 4 1 
Bansal 8 14 7 6 
Mymensingh 2 19 29 2 
Chittagong 3 4 8 6 
Com ilia 1 4 2 5 
Hilt Tracts 1 2 2 
Noakhati 6 4 1 
Rajshahi 3 1 
Khulna. 7 5 7 
Dinajpur 3 3 
Bogra 1 
Rangpur 1 7 10 5 
Kushtia 1 15 
Sylhet 4 7 9 4 
Jessore 5 8 3 
Pabna 1 2 2 2 
TOTAL 38 90 110 50 
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[Source: Report of the Police Administration of the Prov.ince of East Bengal, Years 1948-1951, 
EBGP, Dacca] 
causing death and grievous injuries·.34 The police opened fire on poluas (Persons who 
catch fish with polos) numbering about three to four thousand while they were fishing in 
Gazaria Bee/ causing death to one person and injuring four others. This 'overzealous' act 
of a 'trigger conscious' officer-in-charge of. a poUce station, according to the enquiring 
magistrate, 'greatly excited' the public. Processions condemning the incident continued 
for some days and a public meeting was held where the police action was condemned.35 
The Enquiring Officer commented that 'the poluas fired upon were plying polos in tenant's 
rayati lands and were unarmed and did not threaten anybody and did not commit criminal 
trespass upon the landlord's portion of the bee/ and did not commit any mischief and 
formed no unlawful assembly' .36 In fact, according to him, the poluas were fishing on the 
tenants' land where they caught fish every year and were also entitled to do so. He 
concluded in his report that 'the Police firing in question was unnecessary and unjustified 
and the Officer-in-Charge's order to open fire was not according to .law'. 
The abrupt and brutal nature of police intervention was in evidence again within three 
months of the Gazaria beef incident. This time the violence occurred at a place called 
SUchahati Bamandanga in Gaibandha subdivision of Rangpur district on 16 March 1949. 
In this particular incident a sub-inspector and three armed constables opened fire on a 
large number of people who gathered to catch fish in a zamindar's bee/. As a result three 
} 
persons were killed .and five others were injured.37 The Inspector-General of Police 
urged the subordinate officials 'to prevent similar further mischief by uninformed acts on 
the part of thana officers•.38 But this cautionary note failed to prevent such incidents 
from repeating. The police again opened fire on a gathering of about one thousand 
people who came to catch fish in Noai Mondol bee/ in Char Haripur police station of 
Sirajganj sub-division in Pabna district on 29 December 1951. As a result one person 
was killed and several others sustained injuries. This time it happened despite a circular 
i~ued by the Inspector-General of Police. A higher official commented on the incident 
that it was 'rather unfortunate that in spite of discussion ... on a similar ... firing the police 
have again interfered in a civil dispute' .39 
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In all three incidents the police interfered with the customary rights of the villagers who 
came to catch fish in the marshes and swamps locally known as bee/. After the incident 
at Noai Mondol bee/ at Char Haripur an official commented that it was a 'matter of civil 
dispute between the alleged lessee and the villagers' who contended that they caught fish 
in the bee/ every year.40 The observation of the Inspector-General of Police on case 
number 75 of 1949, i.e. on the police firing at Buchahati Bamandanga in Rangpur, was 
that 'the Sub-Inspector argued with the people who had come to catch fish in pursuance 
of a customary right and tried to persuade them not to catch fish in the course of which 
altercation ensued'.41 The Enquiring Officer who investigated the Gazaria bee/ firing 
contended that the Officer-in-Charge of Manikganj police station was informed that the 
poluas caught fish every year in the bee/. 42 
In fact, the rights of the people to catch fish in the marshes and swamps of East Bengal 
was long established. The beets served 'as a reservoir of fresh water fish ample enough 
to provide a secondary source of livelihood for a predominantly rice growing population of 
the province. As a result a large number of the villagers exploited the beels'.43 In 1923 
O'Malley observed that 'Besides regular fishing polo fishing is an old pastime indulged in 
by the villagers in the summer'. He also observed that men, women and children, 
sometimes numbering hundreds troop with palos in hand to the nearest bee/. 44 Normally 
polo fishing was followed by prior announcements to the neighbouring village bazars by 
indigenous means. The father of a 'victim' of police firing deposed to the Enquiring 
Officer that there was an 'announcement by beat of drum that fish would be caught in 
Gazaria bee I'. 45 
In all the three incidents the police alleged that 'a large mob armed with deadly weapons 
and fishing apparatus' assembled to catch fish thus causing 'apprehension of a serious 
breach of peace'. But according to practice and witnesses the poluas had no deadly 
weapon with them 'as at polo baises (competition) joties, tatas, katras, and koches were 
not allowed to be used' and indeed could not be used since fishes did not float and 
hurling of such instruments was considered dangerous to the crowd of poluas.46 In fact 
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in all the three beefs the villagers numbering more than thousands came to exercise their 
customary rights to fish and not with any common intention to assault the police. Rather, 
the police in their uncalled for intervention were not acting in their capacity of public 
servants. The visibility of these customary ·forces of collective behaviour made them 
convenient targets for members of the police force. One official commented that 'the 
Police displayed indecent zeal on receipt of information of apprehension of breach of 
peace by not informing the Sub-divisional Officer and acting on their own•.47 In no cases 
there was any apprehension of breach of peace simply because there were no restraining 
parties to give resistance to the poluas. 
The Inspector-General of Police commented that 'the elements which entitled the Police 
to use firearms for the protection of fishing rights did not exist' and therefore he dismissed 
the justification of the deputation of armed force.48 Commenting on the Gazaria beef 
firing the District Magistrate wrote in his confidential note that 'Police administration in the 
Sub-Division has been in a bad way'. 49 Cases of this nature where a thana officer acted 
in an 'utterly irresponsible' and irregular manner gave vent to deeper antagonism 
between the affected communities and the police. One official explanation was that this 
kind of action could only happen from 'lack of assessment of situation due to lack of 
training·.SO This perception which was not uncommon in higher police bureaucracy 
overlooked or deliberately concealed the relationship between the powerful section of the 
rural world and the police. 
It was invariably the dominant villagers who sought, and quite often 'bought' and utilised 
police power to their advantage. In all three cases the police acted on behalf of the 
owner of the land and intervened in the customary practice of fishing by the villagers in 
the beefs. The Home Secretary in his note suspected that the officer-in-charge of 
Manikganj police station did act in the Gazaria bee/firing case 'from motives of gain'.51 
The use of firearms by the police being induced by powerful persons was quite common. 
On 22 January 1952 the police resorted to shooting in a village fair in Savar police station 
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in Dhaka district and killed one person. AccortUng to the report of the Executive Enquiry 
'there were two parties of gamblers in the me/a (fair) and one of the parties influenced the 
police party to drive away the other'.52 Police intervention was not only confined to 
brutally attacking the customary rights of the people on such occasions, but also to 
interfering in land disputes between 'parties', the police word for contending groups. In 
fact, partisan policing continued to remain a prominent feature of public action in post-
independent East Bengal Society. 
On 31 March 1948 at Char Digaldi police station in Dhaka district the police intervened to 
stop 'forcible harvesting of paddy' by members of one 'party' from the land of another. As 
a result a conflict started and the police opened fire~ And three persons were killed. 53 A 
similar incident happened in Ghona Bashiapara in Satkhira police station of Khulna 
district on 9 December 1952. The police acted on behalf of one Aminuddin when some 
cart men were engaged to carry the reaped paddy of one Abdul Huq Gazi. The cart men 
refused to comply with the police order to divert the paddy to the house of the President 
of the Union Board. As a result the police assaulted the cart men and opened fire to 
disperse villagers who gathered to protest against the assault of the cart men.54 One of 
the most flagrant instanc.es of partisan poficing took place· on 20 November 1952 at 
Nabinagar police station of Comilla district. The police intervened in a private land 
dispute and opened fire and killed four persons 'most unjustifiably and unreasonably'. 
The Judicial Enquiry report on this firing used strong words to condemn this kind of police 
action that took place in Nabinagar.55 
on some other occasions, too, the police opened fire to disperse people who came to 
resist police actions considered illegal and unjustified by the people. On 29 March 1950 
at PukhaJi in Jessore district the police opened fire on the people Who offered resistance 
to one head constable and a lower constable alleged to have come to terms with some 
members of the minority community who apparently/allegedly tried to transfer contraband 
arfJCies and movable properties across the border to India in exchange for money.56 
Sometimes subordinate police opened fire on the people out of revenge and hatred. On 
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13 October 1949, the Pakistan Observer reported that 'Following a scuffle between a boy 
and a police constable, attached to Kazipur police station, at Kazipur hat the latter was 
severely assaulted by the crowd ... On receiving this information, the Kazipur police, 
armed with guns, hastened to the spot and resorted to firing, wounding seriously one 
person' who later succumbed. 57 Incidents of a similar natura where the police acted out 
of feelings of revenge were not infrequent. Whenpe~sant~ rebelled 1 J)Oiice, on a number 
of occasions,opened fire and carried out wanton atrocities on the struggling peasants in 
revenge for rebellion. 58 
Police atrocities were not limited to occasionally shooting people whimsically; in fact, 
instances of 'gross illegality committed by persons entrusted with the maintenance of law 
and order' were too many. Sometimes individuals in collusion with the police allegedly 
attempted to kidnap women whom they fancied. On 26 August 1951, the Sub-Divisional 
Officer in a Judicial Enquiry into police firing88 in Nagar-Kanda police station in Faridpur 
district mentioned that one Latif 'in collusion with the police ... attempted to elope Sahara 
Khatun: a widow from village Pukuria.59 On some other occasions the members of the 
law enforcing agencies were themselves allegedly involved in abducting women 
belonging to minority community. Indeed it was a recurrent complaint by the leaders of 
the Hindu community. In a petition to a Deputy Secretary of the Home Department, 
Rasaraj Mondol, General Secretary of East Bengal Schedule Caste Federation 
complained regarding the inaction of the police force in recovering a Hindu housewife 
allegedly abducted by an ansar Commander. He also alleged that 'as things stand the 
-. 
members of the minorities have lost all confidence in the police of the Kurigram thana. SO 
Members of the minority community, especially their social leaders in the rural areas ) 
brought many complaints against the police for the latter's alleged complicity with 
criminals. In one such complaint to the Chief Secretary, the President of the Baofal Union 
Board along with twenty -four other signatories of Morrelganj and Kachua police stations 
of Khulna district alleged that 'cows and bullocks of householders generally of minority 
communities were stolen away at night and through the agents of the authors of the crime 
intimation is sent to the owners and heavy ransoms are realised to restore them'. They 
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further alleged that 'police authorities are aware of these crimes and perhaps of the 
authors thereof but no steps are known to be undertaken by them to prevent these 
heinous crimes'.61 
The complaint of communal disposition of the police was made very strongly by Jogen 
Mondo! in his letter of resignation from the Central Cabinet. He alleged that the police 
pursued an anti-Hindu policy and carried out barbarous atrocities against Hindus on 
frivolous grounds.62 In fact, members of the minority community became panicky due to 
the changed political circumstances that deprived them of political power in post-
independent East Bengal. But police zulum was uniformly applied to the social weaklings 
irrespective of caste and creed. The vertical ties that existed during the Raj between the 
lower police and the local elites - 'individuals with the wealth, influence, and authority to 
command their services· continued to be conspicuous and enduring in post-colonial East 
Bengal.63 It will be evident from a memorandum to the Chief Minister on 10 April1948, 
by Presidents of Union Boards of Shyamnagar police station of Khulna district. · The 
memorialists alleged that 'the police zulum on the Muslims went on increasing day-by-day 
as their pockets began to be filled up with money paid by the Hindu Zamindars'. They 
also alleged that 'the police had indiscriminately arrested respectable Muslim matbars 
(social leaders) on false and flimsy grounds and put them in hazat (lock up) without any 
rhyme and reason'.64 The incident that agitated the memorialists most was one that took 
place on 2 April 1948 when some people of Ranjan Nagar and neighbouring villages 
carrying coconuts and other merchandise worth about Rs 2000 from Nazimganj hat for 
-.._ 
business purposes, were robbed by members of the Border Police. When the villagers 
asked for money, some of them were taken to the police camp at Halderkhali and beaten 
to such an extent that one of them fainted and some others were wrongfully confined by 
the police and detained in the camp.65 
The Prime Minister noted the incident as 'a case of Border Police oppression', while 
forwarding this for investigation.66 'The Zulum on the local people' reported a Member of 
the Legislative Assembly on 24 April 1948, 'had been done by the police so mercilessly 
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that they were forced to leave their houses along with their families. 67 The reason for 
police atrocities against the people as perceived by the memorialists was the resistance 
of the local people to the smuggling activities of the locally powerful Hindu zamindars in 
collusion with the Border Police.68 
Many police outposts in the countryside, like the one I have mentioned, became centres 
of oppression for the socially disadvantaged groups in the countryside, be they Hindus or 
Muslims. The SOC Hakulaki reported that the nankar peasants after the police firing at 
Saneswar used to look askance at the ponce outpost. The sub-divisional officer of 
Gapalganj mentioned in a report on 21 February 1949 that 'some people, many of whom 
were musalmans, said that it was the wont of the constables of Maharajpur outpost to 
come out at night on patrol duty and extort money from the people ..• and as such the 
outpost made itself a terror to the locafitr. 69 
Quite often the manifestation of pollee· power was disproportionate to the degree of 
alleged crime committed by the people. Instances of police raids on the houses of 
alleged criminals were many indeed; and complaints about police excesses, harassment 
and misbehaviour towards the members of the family of suspected criminals followed the 
raids. One Amlr Hamja of village Nimbari of Camilla district petitioned the Prime Minister 
on 7 January 1950 complaining of police atrocities during a raid on his house. The police 
allegedly plundered his household goods worth Rs 2000, misbehaved with his wife and 
other members of the family. All this happened when he was away from home. He also 
mentioned that similar raids were being carried out in other villages also by the police of 
Kasba police station.70 In another such complaint six persons of village·Mohabbatpur of 
Noakhali district petitioned the Governor General of Pakistan, along with other officials in 
the hierarchy of administration, about police atrocities during a raid in their house on 20 
. 
May 1948, in their absence and without any warrant. The police allegedly destroyed 
household materials and abused the female members of the house who were present 
during the raid. 71 Indeed, the police had an exaggerated view of themselves. In their 
dealings with people they were haughty, impolite, and quite often oppressive. On 16 May 
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1949, thirty signatories from the area under the jurisdiction of the Nawabganj police 
station in Dhaka district petitioned the Prime Minister alleging that they had been 
'groaning under various kinds of police zulum exacerbated by a havilder and the 
constables attached to Nawabganj outpost'. Many complained in the petition that the 
conduct of the police personnel unmistakeably showed that there was no power above 
them, that they were independent of control and supervision, and that they were 'the 
almighty and alf powerful masters of the locality'. 72 
The authority entrusted by the State on the police tended to give them an exaggerated 
notion of their own power as though they were not accountable to anybody. In the 
complaint of the Secretary of the Sandip Association of Chittagong district to the 
Superintendent of Police on 20 July and again on 7 September 1952, signed by several 
boatmen of Sandip steamer station, the misuse of power by the . police personnel was 
quite eloquent. The boatmen alleged that the police compelled them 'under threat of 
physical torture' to carry them to the steamer at unusual hours of night which involved a 
great risk to the safety of the boat and to'their own lives. They further alleged that the 
policemen dragged them from their houses late at night, if they showed reluctance, 
without having any regard for the privacy of their womenfolk. Moreover, . 
they never paid the boatmen for their services.73 Some policemen demanded a total 
obedience to their author)ty. ln this context argument was perceived to be an affront to 
their power. 'How dare you open your mouth in front of a Daroga• was the retort of a 
thana officer to a nankar peasant leader. 7 4 Here police power corresponded closely with 
the feudal power that prevailed in the East Bengal Society. Norms of verbal deference 
and silence as a sign of subordination to authority was demanded of the people by the 
police officials.75 As a result quite often policemen resorted to feudal fonns of 
punishment and dealings with the people. One police sub-inspector of Ramgati police 
station in Noakhali district was alleged to have said ' I can do and undo whatever I like, 
because.! am empowered to arrest anybody' .76 In an incident between a government 
employee and a circle ·inspector o.f police in Lakshmipur police station in Noakhali, the 
said officer allegedly told a. bus driver that 'If you find these people [the employees 
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belonging to the Constructions and Buildings Department of the Government) run them 
down and bring them to me after they are killed'. 
This particulai policemen was sentenced after being found guilty by the Court for 
assaulting a government employee.n But for most of the poor this option was simply 
unavailable. Lack of education and financial resources deprived the masses of even 
such rights as freedom from arrest and protection from police zulum. On the powers that 
the police exercised over the population, the constitutional checks had been almost 
inoperative. 78 
On 10 April 1948, the memorialists of Shyamnagar in Khulna after the police atrocities 
complained that 'nobody can dare lodge any information to the authorities concerned 
against the Border Police.79 'Some of the alleged victims of the police excesses', 
recorded a Civil Servant in his enquiry report on ... April 1948, 'refused to make any 
statement' .so After the police atrocities· in some villages of Sylhet one affected woman 
deposed to the sub-Deputy Collector when asked if she could produce any witness in 
support . of her statement, 'No, through fear of zamindars and the pollee of the camp, 
nobody will dare give any evidence because as soon as you will go, police will come, 
catch hold of anyone who will depose, arrest him and realize money from him'.81 
This apprehension and fear of a village woman proved to be real on a number· of 
occasions. On 16 December 1947 one Amir Ali of Kandipara in Mymensingh district 
petitioned the Chief Secretary of the East Bengal Government alleging police atrocities 
which occurred following his lodgement of a criminal case against a sub-inspector of 
police attached to Graffargaon police station for the latter's 'high handedness, wrongful 
•· 
restraint, wrongful confinement, assault and extortions'. As the petition sought legal 
protection the police party raided and arrested some of the witnesses and mercilessly 
assaulted them 'regardless of their age•.82 After the police firing at Nabinagar in which 
four persons were killed, Jaj Mia, who belonged to the same party as these victims, was 
arrested when he went to Brahmanbaria to lodge a case against the police.83 The 
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incident of police torture on Ebadullah for lodging a criminal suit against the Officer-in-
Charge of Sana police station in Sylhet clearly demonstrated how vulnerable the 
complainants were. In this case the complainant was brutally assaulted by the police in 
front of the very court where the hearing took place. According to a Naobelal report, this 
incident created great resentment among the people in and around Sunarnganj 
subdivision.84 In fact, reports of police torture in custody after arrests resulting 
sometimes in death were not uncommon. One such incident that happened as a result of 
merciless beatings by the police of a suspect in a dacoity case created an uproar in the 
province and 'gave rise to violent public comments'. Even the Inspector-General of 
Police expressed his worries to the Superintendent of Police of Mymensingh about the 
serious nature of the incident.85 
Azan reported on 7 May 1953 yet another incident that happened on 6 May in Rangunia 
police station in Chittagong district in which an assistant sub-inspector of police caused 
death to a person by striking him with his danda (truncheon) while the former tried to 
escape arrest. When three people related to the deceased went to the police station to 
lodge a case against the assistant sub-inspector they were arrested.86 This kind of 'rash 
and negligent' act on the part of the police drew harsh comments from the executives 
who conducted the judicial enquiry into the incident.87 
Occasionally, police violence found its way into the prisons as well. A dramatic illustration 
of this was an incident that took place in the Khapra ward of Rajshahi district jail on 24 
April1950 when the police opened fire on the political detainees and the activists of the 
peasant uprisings of the preceding years and killed seven of them and injured many 
others.88 
It was quite difficult for the victims of police atrocities to seek justice defying 'all obstacles 
put in the way'. In fact, people were too demoralised even to lodge complaints against 
the police because of familiar police brutalities that used to follow the complaints. Even 
then the people dared to bring cases against the police for various crimes perpetrated on 
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them. The following table might give an impress.ion about the extent and nature of police 
atrocities against the people of East Bengal. 
TABLE7.2 
Year-wise breakdown of criminal cases brought against the police in East Bengal 
between 1948-1953. 
Year Allegation Extortion Bribery Assault/ 
of Wrongful 
Torture Confinement 
1948 14 33 94 193 
1949 22 75 112 216 
1950 11 44 61 276 
1951 19 40 93 173 
1952 19 48 45 215 
1953 33 56 37 205 
[Source: Report on the Police Administration of the Province of East Bengal, for the Years 
1S}48.;1953. East Bengal Government Press, Dacca.] 
....,_ 
Obviously, many cases went unreported. Not only the poor peasants of East Bengal, 
most of whom did not dare report against the arbitrary and excessive use of force by the 
police, sometimes even people with social and professional standing felt too scared to 
seek justice against police oppression. In an incident that led to a clash between the 
police and railwaymen at Chandpur on 27 March 1949, the doctor, who attended the 
injured and later was himself assaulted by the police, 'refused to make any statement' 
against the police. He feared that such an act would have endangered the lives of his 
family members.89 The fear of harassment and victimisation of those who dared to 
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report or depose against police personnel was even noted in the Pollee Committee 
Report of 1953.90 
For many in East Bengal silence became the language of coping with· police violence. 
But silence was not total, nor was it all pervasive. When maintenance of public order had 
become synonymous with a vindictive spirit of police persecution the latter undermined 
their own legitimacy in the eyes of the people. On many occasions police became targets 
of mass vendetta. 'Coercion was both a deterrent and a stimulant of protest. It aroused 
fear but it also provoked anger among the peopfe'.91 East Bengal social scene was no 
different. As the elements of feudal power, supported by people donning uniforms and 
insignia bearing the sanction of the state power, continued to oppress the weaker 
sections of society, they also provoked short-lived, violent and collective resistance 
against 'excessive', 'unfai.r' and 'unjust' use of force by state agencies. 
IV 
Theoretically, there was scope for the people· to seek redress from any high handedness 
or arbitrary, unjust and illegal actions of any public servants, be they members of the 
police force or civil service. But in the social context of East Bengal this scope was 
beyond the reach of most of the people. Going to court was an expensive affair and 
moreover litigations meant a lengthy process involving frequent absence from home of 
the adult male member or members for the courts were in district or sub-divisional 
headquarters. Bad communications, Jack of boarding facilities in the small towns and 
unfamiliar life in the towns dampened the immediate anger of many who had been 
outraged by the police violence. As a result, seeking justice for transgressions of rights 
by the law enforcing authorities became the privilege of the rural well-to-do (though this 
does not mean that justice was always done to even this group). 
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It was through telegrams, petitions, memoranda, delegations and sometimes newspapers 
and public meetings that the affected vented their complaints to higher authorities. These 
liberal forms of protest were again available primarily to the rural elites. After the 
Sirajganj shooting the Pakistan Observer reported that 'the leading persons of Kazipur' 
have wired to the authorities protesting against alleged high handedness of the police.92 
Many such protests clearly signalled a lack of confidence in the police as the aggrieved 
people would often demand non-police or even, non-offiCial enquiry into police atrocities. 
Official enquiries were thought to be so partisan thatthe people quite often rejected them 
altogether. 
Protest as an expression of conflict in response to police excesses and atrocities took 
different forms. Quite often violent means were adopted to defend personal and 
collective rights of the people if these were threatened and/or violated by the members of 
the law enforcing agencies. 
Life in East Bengal, especially in the countryside, was organised around, traditional social 
norms which at times led to viOlent conflicts with the activities of the agents of the state, 
perceived to be a distant and outside entity by the masses of the rural people. On such 
occasions the villagers· temporarily reversed the relationship that existed between the 
police arid themselves. One element which played a role in the reversal was the 
villagers' notion of honour and dignity which were themselves influenced by their 
perception of tradition.93 The incident, at Gabtoli Bazar in Mymensingh on 8 April 1953, 
when an O.C. along with some members of the rural police were assaulted, originated 
from an injured sense of prestige of 'the accused number one', a President of the Union 
Board. On the occasion of Astami Snan (a ritual bath on the second day of Durga Puja), 
a me/a (fair), used to be held at a place about a mile from Gabtoli Bazar. But a year 
before the incident took place .the President of the Union Board shifted the venue of the 
me/a 'by exercising his influence' from the original ptace to Gabtoli Bazar. As a 
consequence of this shifting there was 'riot between the President of the Union Board's 
party and his opponents' and two murders were committed. As a result no me/a was 




the President of the Union Board and his men. The Superintendent of Police observed 
that 'the President of the Union Board's position was also undermined before his men' 
and thus injured 'he wanted to take revenge' against the Officer-in-Charge of the thana 
who stopped the me/a from being held.94 Abdus Shahid mentioned the anger of the 
people and the volunteers in Bakpur Surjamukhi me/a in Barisal district in early 1948 
when the daroga and his constables defied the order of the village volunteers of the mela 
by crossing the bamboo bridge which was prohibited from use during the me/a. Shahld 
recalled that as a result of this blatant disregard of the orders of the volunteers, people in 
thousands encircled the police camp in the mela. The prestige of the village volunteers 
thus seen to be undermined by the police led to the intensification of anger of the 
people.95 
On many occasions the rural people resisted the police from a sense of what was 'right' 
and 'just'. When the police were on the 'wrong' side they faced a determined, though 
often short-lived, resistance from the people. Resistance to arrests and attempts to 
rescue arrested persons from the custody of the police provide interesting material for 
any attempt to understand the nature of the 'legitimacy' of the law enforcing authority in 
the eyes of the people. 
Jn the,~hyam Nagar incident on 10 April 1948, in the opinion of the memorialists, when 
some of the villagers were 'wrongfully confined' by the police and detained in the camp, 
some people from the detainees' own village came to their rescue.96 In another incident 
when the people founq out at Pukra in Faridpur district that a widow's safety and honour 
were at stake, the villagers decided to protect her 'and they did [so] by chasing the police 
party' .97 The Pakistan Observer reported on 14 September 1949 that on 11 September 
'the Police party had gone to the village of Habiganj in Sylhet district to arrest an alleged 
abS(:Onder. On arrival they were attacked by a crowd of villagers·~98 
On many occasions conflict arose between the police and the people from a contrary 
understanding and interpretation of legality. On 16 March 1954 the ASI of Faridpur police 
226 
station in Pabna district stated in his FIR that after arresting an accused the police were 
faced with resistance from the people who gathered 'unlawfully' and attacked the police 
party to forcibly 'free' the arrested. The ASI told 'the mob' that they had followed the law 
in arresting the accused but 'the mob' paid no heed.99 Here the police notion of legality 
and the people's notion of the same were opposite to each other and around this 
opposition a battle took place. 
These kind of conflicts were of frequent occurrence. On 20 October 1951, at Auspara in 
Sylhet district one arrested person was rescued by villagers numbering about one 
hundred and armed with 'deadly weapons'. They injured six policemen and forcibly 
rescued the arrested from the police.1 00 Popular anger against all that 'constituted and 
symbolized' police power was evident in the incident at Koyachhara tea garden on 16 
October 1949. After the arrest of their 'leader' the coolies armed with 'deadly weapons' 
and forming and 'unlawful assembly' attacked the police party and attempted to rescue 
the arrested person and also to·snatch away·the government muskets from police.101 In 
another incident on 2 July 1948 at Chowgacha in Jessore district the angry crowd 'made 
an attack' on the pollee outpost hurling brickbats following a scuffle between a policeman 
and some members of the public that resulted in the arrest of some of them.102 In fact, 
the people in the rural areas occasionaUy succeeded in forcibly rescuing the arrested 
persons. In 1;948 there were seven such cases of forcible rescue by the people from the 
custody of the police. The same number of arrested were rescued in 1949. But the 
figure jumped in 1950 and remained almost steady till 1953 as the following table will 
show. 
TABLE7.3 
Year-wise breakdown of cases of forcible rescue from police custody in East Bengal 






40 27 35 
{Source: Report on the Police Administration of the Province of East Bengal, for the years 
1948·1953, East Bengal Government Press, Dacca.} 
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This trend suggests the declining legitimacy of the police in effecting arrests for 'crimes' 
which the people refused to accept. The extent of popular antipathy to all that constituted 
the regime of 'discipline and punish' is. evident from the number of 'escapes' from police 
custody also. 
Confinement is perhaps universally disliked but in the case of East Bengal society the 
prospect of quick arid fair trial was rare. Cases involved lengthy proceedings, which was 
regularly resented by the Inspectors-General of Police.103 Unhealthy, inhuman 
conditions, lack of accommodation, regular tyrannies and brutalities that were associated 
with prison· ·Jife made prison and police. custody unacceptable to the convicts and 
prisoners awaiting trial.1 04 
'Police stations, instead of becoming a place of refuge and help for the oppressed and the 
poor', complained a Muslim League MLA, 'have become. centres of oppression and 
terror' ,1 05 Perhaps for aft these reasons reinforced by the vast member of the society's 
attitude to the pollee and police justice the escapees from pollee· custody were quite 
acceptable to the community. In fact, on many occasions even by the measure of the law 
·of the land the 'accused' were innocent. We have so far no cases - in the early years of 
East Bengal - of people handing an 'escapee· over to the police. What led occasionally to 
their rearrests was the agility of the rural police and their informers - people mostly hated 
by the lower orders In the villages. Let us now look at the number of police escapees to 




Year-wise breakdown of no. of escapees from the prison and police custody in East 
Bengal between 1948-53 
No. of escapees 85 100 80 86 60 48 
[Source: Report on the Police Administration of the Province of East Bengal, for the 
years 1948-1953, East Bengal Government Press, Dacca.] 
These are obviously instances of resistance offered within the arena of confinement 
organised and supervised by the police. The collective, however defined, outside the 
custodial world of the police is conspicuous by its absence from the actions that made 
escapes possible. There were instances of resistance organised individually or 
collectively within the four walls of the prisons or lock-ups that led to escape. But the 
'community' is very much present in some other instances of resistance to the police. 
The Police Report of 1948 observed that in discharging public duties the police had to 
face 'numerous attacks'. There were as many as 131 cases of assault on the police 
resulting in the death of one constable and injuries to 232 officers and men of whom 11 
were seriousJ06 Atrocity, humiliation and coercion - combined to give expression to 
police zulum - were now turned against them. Some constables were speared, killed and 
bU!ied at Nacho! in Rajshahi by the enraged Santhals, so that no trace of them was left 
behind. The daroga, whom we have met in Chapter 5, who was assaulted by the nankar 
peasants one night for allegedly gratifying his lust on peasant women, was subjected, 
according to Bhattacharya, to a combination of anger and revengeful feeling that had 
accumulated over time.1 07 
The act of taking the law into one's own hands was also a measure of the want of 
confidence in law enforcement agencies of the state. For the people who were involved 
in taking revenge against police personnel it could also mean that the liberal democratic 
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mechanisms of law and justice failed to replace the pre-existing norms and practice of 
power which remained real to both the police and the people. In this circumstance 
coercion could only generate resistance. This phenomenon was ruefully recognised by 
, an Inspector-General of Police when he wrote that 'For any opposition from the side of 
police in exercise of their lawful authority, the people build up a psychological resistance 
against them' and if the actions were directed against a group or a large section of 
people, the feelings of the people were likely to be roused against the police for enforcing 
the law ,'even within the strictly constituted lines of authority' .1 08 But the 'constituted lines 
of authority' remained hazy and complex both to the people and to a large section of the 
constabulary and the officers. In 1949 the Inspector-General of Police observed that 
cases of assault on the police had increased. In all there were 155 cases of assault on 
the police in 1949, resulting in injuries to 317 officers and men of whom 13 received 
serious injuries ai1d two proved fataf.1 09 The trend continued. There were 151 cases of 
assault on the police resulting in the murder of one sub-inspector and three constables 
and 181 officers and men were injured of whom five were serious in 1950. The Inspector-
General of Police admitted that 'assault on the police was on the Jncrease' in that year 
too.11 0 There were one hundred and eleven cases of assault on police resulting In 
serious injuries to eight officers and men in 1951, but in 1952 the situation further 
deteriorated. 'There were however more assaults on the police than·in 1951', commented 
th8 I!J$p~~or·General of Police.111 In 1953 the total number of assaults on the police 
was 112. including the death of two and serious injury of five officers and men.112 
This trend of unabated acts of assault on the members of the law and order agency of the 
state proved that the arbitrary, coercive, partisan practice of the former did not go 
unchallenged, that police power was often met with 'people power', however fragile and 
short-lived. Through their actions the people who defied police power constantly 
displayed a notion of 'community' which was at variance and often in conflict with the 
jUridical notions of the state. The sudden expressions of solidarity among the rural 
masses on the presupposltion that there already exist affinal bonds which then became a 
'natural' premise for collective action against the police, were an instance of this 
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phenomenon.113 In many cases of resistance to police what constituted the solidarity 
among the people against the agencies of external domination, especially the various law 
and order agencies, was their notion of 'a community based on the [so called] primordial 
loyalties of religion, habitat, kinship' as has been observed by Chakrabarty in his 
discussion of the jute workers' protests in Bengal. For the peasantry of East Bengal it is 
even more clearly evident.114 
On 20 October 1951 at village Auspara in Sylhet district police arrested Helal Uddin. 'His 
mother, brother and sister came out immediately and offered resistance to the police'; the 
Enquiry Report adds, 'they offered resistance to the police'. They raised hue and cry, 
calling for help from the neighbours... On hearing the incessant cries of Helal Uddin and 
his relations a large number of villagers ... advanced towards the police party:115 Again 
'responding to a cry of the arrested', wrote the Superintendent of Police of Faridpur on the 
incident on 4 November 1949 at Hossainpur in Faridpur district, '18 persons, all kin and 
neighbours, attacked the daroga and the constable with deadly weapons' .116 In another 
incident at Sultanpur in Sylhet, hearing the alarm of an arrested person, his sister and 
mother-came out and resisted the police. The sister came out armed with an iron rod and 
dealt a blow on the head of the constable. 'There was a great row and many people 
including women and children, about 150 to 200 in all, gathered and rescued the 
arrested' .1 17 
The loyalties of kinship (real and imaginary) were so strong in these instances of 
resistance that even women and children also found a place in the state documents. In 
fact, women took quite an active part in resisting arrests of the male members of the 
family and sometimes of the village. In one case in Narail in Jessore district an old 
woman who happened to be the grandmother of the accused, closed the door when the 
police turned up,· and helped her grandson to flee.118 Women often made use of 
inviolable customary practices in order to protect the accused from being arrested. In one 
such case a score of women were standing at the verandah of the hut where 'a 
proclaimed offender' took shelter in order to avoid arrest and the sub-inspector of police 
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was resisted from entering the hut on the false plea that a woman had given birth to a 
child in the hut making the place 'impure' and thus inaccessible to male entry. At times 
the solidarity against police action cut across religious differences in a society where 
religion is often thought to have sharply polarised the Hindus and the Muslims. On 12 
April 1948 a Muslim 'offender' was protected by a Hindu widow by offering the former a 
safe shelter against police pursuit.119 
Faced with the resistance of kin groups, neighbours, co-residents of the same habitat, the 
state experienced real difficulties in pursuing its own goals. 'In the dacoity cases it is only 
the local people who could be competent witnesses', wrote a SDO to the DC Sylhet on 
the prospects of instituting cases against the peasant activists on 6 September 1949 'but 
the accused being their kith and kin', doubted the SDO, 'sufficient evidence may not be 
forthcoming•.120 In this instance the state was confronted with its own limits of coercion. 
The identification of collectivity among the struggling peasants by 'primordial' sentiments 
in some areas in Sylhet set the limit for the coercive power of the state. This was even 
recognised by its own functionaries. 
Indeed, the very presence of police officers intensified a conflict situation. In the earlier 
mentioned incident at Chardigaldi, 'the very sight of police irritated the excited and rowdy 
rnob'.121 'Trouble arose', wrote an enquiring officer on the use of fire-arms at Dhamrai 
on 22 January 1952, 'after the arrival of said police party' .122 Any agency related to the 
police had a similar fate. 'The inimical attitude sometimes of the public towards the 
Government Reporters is well known', wrote the memorialists, 'they are taken for IB 
(Intelligence Branch) officers and all filthy abuses, jeers, and vituperation are showered 
upon them. They become targets for direct attack and criticism·.123 Indeed, the police 
informers lived in peril of popular retribution. 
On many occasions the 'mob' involved in private dispute changed their common object as 
soon as the police arrived. On 19 June 1949 the police party intervened to stop two 
groups fighting at Baidyer Bazar but this invited attack by both groups on the police.124 
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In another conflict between two villages in Mymensingh district on 12 April 1948, the 
police intervened only to invite determined attack from both.125 On occasions when the 
supporters of the Muslim League and the United Front clashed with each other during the 
campaign for the general election, the. police intervened 'to maintain peace and order'; 
then the target of the 'unruly mob' shifted and attacked the police party .126 
The everyday oppression which the pollee carried out alienated them from the people: 
On any pretext the anger of the people fell on them. Sometimes the conflict was carried 
beyond the immediate issue. Since partition Independence Day Tournaments were held 
in which the police participated in order to create 'an atmosphere of goodwill and fellow 
feeling between the police and the public'.127 But on 14 August 1951 wide spread 
lawlessness broke out in the town of Sylhet on the Pakistan National Day. The incident 
originated from a football match' .128 The Karimganj correspondent of the newspaper 
reported that 'on August 14 a football match was arranged there in connection with 
Independence Day celebrations between the Police team and the Rest of Sylhet. Some 
players of the Police team ... wrongfully attacked some players of the Rest of Sylhet 
which was disliked by the public ... Objections were raised from the public against the 
offending players. The situations soon became grave and the police made indiscriminate 
..... charge on members of the public. ... A clash between the police and the public 
ensued'. The government issued a press note on 15 August in which it said that, the 
Football match 'Police-vs-Rest' had to be abandoned as a result of rowdyism. There was 
an unseemly fracas between the protagonists of the two sides. The quarrel was 
unfortunately carried beyond the play ground and a number of persons received injuries, 
fiVe of them serious' .129 The Press Note that followed the incident mentioned that a 
curfew was imposed on that night and prohibited the assembly of five or more persons for 
one week in Sylhet. 
r 
On 17 September of the same year in the final of the Amulya Memorial Football 
Competition there was a clash between the police team and the team of the Merchant's 
club of Barisal. The clash eventually involved the public and the police. The District 
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Magistrate strongly intervened and took action against the police personnel responsible 
for the trouble. In a note to the Commissioner of Dhaka Division, he wrote that 'it will be 
construed in various quarters ... as a 'victory' of the townspeople over the police' .130 The 
police and the public clashed again in Noakhali football field.131 The government was 
concerned at 'the growing number of such clashes between the police and the public at 
football matches·.132 In view of the situation the government considered stopping the 
police from playing matches with the public to avoid 'all chance of conflict'. The 
government was worried at the continuous 'criticism in the Press and from the political 
platform for every indiscretion committed by an individual or few individuals during a 
sporting event•.133 A similar incident took place on Bogra Football Ground in August 
1953. As a result twenty one policemen and twelve members of the public were 
injured.134 
The District Magistrate of Barisal feared that the causes of the clash were 'deep-
rooted'.135 The roots went far beyond the play ground. All the clashes turned out to be 
an enactment of minor rebellion, though short-lived by the people against the law and 
order agency. What were playful competitions between the police and the people within 
the boundary of non-antagonistic rules of the game changed codes in course of the game 
and turned out to be violent and antagonistic. Tension rose so much in the everyday fife 
of the community that it took the slightest provocation to spread violence beyond the 
. 
confines of the play ground. A solidarity of players, spectators, and a large section of the 
townspeople emerged against the police force. In Sylhet the crowd were reported to have 
attacked the car of the superintendent of police as the conflict spread and grew larger in 
size. Attacks took place far away from the place of conflict. On the Sylhet incident the 
Karimganj correspondent reported that two policemen on duty on the police-point at 
Bandar bazar were also attacked following the conflict· in the football field.136 Hence the 
collective expressed itself by its opposition to the police and whatever stood as signs of 
police power. 
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Sometimes this 'unity' of the people against the police drew its legitimacy from a popular 
interpretation of political independence. In an incident of Rajoir in Faridpur when the 
peasants attacked the police to release arrested persons, one of the attackers allegedly 
said that the police in Pakistan had no power to arrest a man in an assault case. No 
doubt the law of the land did not bear out this supposition but that was what gave the 
angry peasants the 'right' to attack the police party. 
Predictably, all the transient resistance of the people to police aggression created 
contexts for the state to strengthen and expand the police force in order to meet fresh 
challenges to its own power. Police power, thus, received sustenance from the sporadic, 
dispersed, short-lived 'flashes of anger' of the people. However for the political elite 
running the government in East Bengal, police actions against the people introduced 
tensions that gradually corroded the basis of their own unity. 
v 
The importance of the policeman was adequately recognised by the ruling elite in East 
Bengal. They seldom missed any opportunity to eulogise the services supposedly 
rendered by the police to nation-building. The Prime Minister, in an address to the police 
officials, defined their job as 'to hold the balance between man and man, between parties 
and parties, between all classes of citizens'137, and contrary to the colonial 
administrator's low opinion of the police, the Muslim League government claimed to have 
been 'actuated by sincere sympathy for the police force'. The ruling elite believed that 
they 'could not have industrial development, agricultural advancement, educational 
progress' without the hard work done by the policemen. Popular perception that the 
policemen were 'concerned only with criminals' was discarded by the ruling elite, instead 
the police were assigned the task of 'handling the people' in order to achieve an orderly 
society.138 
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The Prime Minister in a speech set the ideal for the police. 'By fostering a general respect 
for law and order', he said, 'we shall be able to build Pakistan on the ideals which the 
founder cherished so dearly, namely- a Pakistan where there would be no injustice, no 
distinction between man and man, when it comes to offer any protection to its citizens, 
and that the Government will always be guided by a sense of fair play and render help to 
those who need it and put down those who oppress the weak and the down-trodden'.139 
Obviously the police were assigned an important role in this scenario. The PM also 
stressed the neutrality of police in nation-building and state-building activities. 
But the gap between officially stated 'ideals' and actual conduct of the police was 
particularly great. The consequence ofthis was not only resented by a large section of 
the people; the Muslim League in fact reaped the bitter harvest of the misdeeds of the 
force. To the people of East Bengal the police remained a 'spectacle of excess' as they 
were during the Raj. 'The very name police', according to a Member of the Constituent 
Assembly, 'was a terror to the people in the countryside'.140 In fact, all through the rule 
of the Muslim league in East Bengal the police-people relation was a sore point for the 
administration. One of the terms of reference of the East Bengal Police Committee which 
was appointed by the Governor of the Province on 23 August 1949, was to examine the 
relationship of the police and the public and to suggest ways to 'bring it into accord with 
modern conditions' .141 For the Muslim League this was to remain an unattainable ideal 
till their last day in power. 
Occasionally the Prime Minister urged the higher police officials to create an atmosphere 
amongst the subordinate staff of cooperation with the public.142 He felt that the general 
complaint of the public was against the lower ranks and asked the latter on occasions to 
stop 'chastising', 'abusing' and 'maltreating' the public143 and to avoid 'harsh treatment 
and method' towards the people. The Prime Minister was aware that the word 'Police 
was synonymous with zulum·. 
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Many Muslim League leaders and activists were concerned about the atrocities that the 
members of the force time and again unleashed on the people. Many of them perceived 
these actions as 'illegal and unjust'. Quite often they brought it to the notice of the 
government at Dhaka. They sent telegrams, wrote memoranda, and at times personally 
communicated it to the higher bureaucrats. As political leaders and activists of the ruling 
party Of1 many occasions they acted as bridges between the government and the people. 
In a telegram as early as 22 December 1947, the MLA from Naogaon in Rajshahi 
informed the Home Minister of police atrocities in Ramnagar. He solicited the Home 
Minister's intervention and relief for the victims of 'police vandalism' .144 Giasuddin 
Pathan, a prominent Muslim league MLA and later a Minister, complained to the 
government about police atrocities in some viiJages of Mymensingh.145 In another 
telegram the Secretary of Teligati Union Muslim League of Netrokona sub-division in 
Mymensingh district informed the Prime Minister's secretariat on 18 June 1949 of police 
atrocities in villages Karatia, Bijoypur, Hatiar,. Tenga Bali Kandi, Teligati in Atpara pollee 
station of Netrokona sub-division. He also solicited 'immediate preventative steps•.146 
Sometime Parliamentary Secretaries forwarded to the· Prime Minister or the Minister 
concerned the grievances of the people against police action. The information of police 
atrocities at Gurudaspur of Rajshahi prompted a parliamentary secretary to ask for 
'immediate judicial enquiry into the matter'.147 Sometimes incidents of police atrocities 
were "epQrted to.the District Officers for enquiry and action. 
Instances of such attempts by individual Muslim League leaders to rectify police discipline 
and redress suffering of the people are many. Sporadic and arbitrary displays of coercive 
power by the police were perceived by many activists and leaders of the Muslim League 
·as provoking hostility towards the Government and as posing serious threats to the rule of 
the Muslim League. They feared that police excesses contributed to the erosion of 
Muslim League popularity in the province. Sometimes individual Initiative within the 
framework of the government was deemed inadequate to the need. Local level Muslim 
League leaders held public meetings and condemned the corruption and excesses by 
officers and members of the force. In one such meeting held in Sylhet on 19 November 
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1947 and presided over by the General Secretary of Assam Provincial Muslim League, 
the following resolution was adopted: 'The public of Sylhet puts on record its profound 
resentment and severe condemnation against the nepotism, favouritism, high-
handedness and misbehaviour of the Superintendent of Police of Sylhet. The meeting 
further demands of the Government of Eastern Pakistan to cause immediate removal of 
the officer from the district•.148. There were other such meetings all over the province. 
Some members of the Muslim League carried the criticism of the police right inside the 
Assembly. To many of them it appeared that the administration of the police department 
was far from satisfactory. One member thought that 'the police officers seemed to have 
achieved personal independence after the partition'. He resented at all those instances of 
officers of the police stations flouting the orders of the magistrates allegedly with impunity. 
This scandalous state of things, it is · believed, needed immediate government 
attention.149 In fact, many League members from time to time condemned police 
excesses and gave contrary views to the necessity of granting more money under Police 
Head in the budget.150 Some members of the League in the Assembly time and again 
mentioned that the relations between the police and the people were not at all 
amicable.151 
Some of them even tried to improve the situation. In a note to the Deputy Secretary of 
the Home Department the Inspector-General of Police mentioned that 'Mr Ahad, MLA, 
saw me over the case and expressed his anxiety for a compromise' as he thought 
'harmonious relations between the police and the public was essential' .152 The police 
authorities responded to such Muslim League criticism in the Assembly by adopting the 
traditional measures of strengthening and increasing the number of supervisory staff; 
which only added to the coercive strength of the force. In response to the request, earlier 
cited, the Inspector-General of Police took steps to post a sub-divisional police officer at 
Satkhira for better supervision of the police against whom the affected people and the 
MLA complained of atrocities.153 
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The police officials always resented interference of outsiders, including Muslim League 
MLAs and Ministers, in their affairs. The Police Committee in its recommendation 
especially discouraged this practice.154 In the conference of the Inspectors General it 
was agreed that in the interest of the police discipline there should definitely have been 
no extra departmental interference in matters of punishment and promotion of the 
police.155 Thus the police favoured and insisted on exclusivity and non-interference from 
the representatives of the public. 
Even when it was found by departmental and judicial enquiries that pollee actions were 
unjustified, the finding was not made public and popular participation in enquiries relating 
to police actions was never encouraged. When the government intended to declare the 
police firing at Noai Mondol beef on 29 December 1951 unjustified, a higher bureaucrat 
differed with the government decision and referred to the practice of the Raj in this 
regard. 'No order is issued', reminded the bureaucrat, 'when the firing is considered to be 
unjustified'. This advice was. accepted and followed by the govemment.156 As a result 
'sometime', as the Commissioner of Chittagong Division noted, 'circumstances were 
occasionally exaggerated to justify pollee firing'. 
There was a general tendency in the police department to 'protect its officers and men', 
and sometimes this tendency was carried to the extreme of supporting a subordinate 
officer at all costs, . even when he was ob~iously at faurt.157 When the police constables 
at Lauta Bahadurpur police camp in Sylhet were all transferred from the camp for their 
alleged indiscriminate torture of the villagers, the Superintendent of Police was unhappy 
about the decision and resented that this action by higher authorities as it had a 
dampening effect on the morale of the force. This perception of the superintending 
officials influenced their attitude in respect of taking the members of the force to task for 
any act 1>f indiscretion. In fact, a Muslim League MLA complained against the 'ruffled 
feeling of higher officers when complaints were made against individual policemen.'158 
The Prime Minister also took note of this tendency of shielding the subordinates by the 
superiors 'as a matter of routine', though he admitted. that the police 'always got the· 
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backing of the Government'. He appealed to the police to judge each case 'on its own 
merit'. But instead of taking the initiative to stop this practice the Prime Minister happily 
depended on the Deputy Inspectors-General of Police to 'take personal interest in this 
respect' so that this particular 'evil' would be eradicated.159 
Due to the lack of popular control over the force, the relation between the people and the 
police deteriorated speedily. People's doubts and suspicions about the government, 
already instilled during the Raj, continued to exist. A number of the Muslim league MLAs 
time and again appealed to the government to work towards changing the 'old 
bureaucratic traditions' of the police and emphasised the need to overhaul the entire 
system thoroughly.160 But nothing happened which could claim to have been initiated by 
the spirit of nationalism. As a result many Muslim league activists lost interest in 
refo~ing the police. A glaring example of the lack of public interest in police affairs was 
evident in the response of the MLAs and MCAs to the questionnaire sent by the Police 
Committee. Only three out of forty four MCAs and twenty out of one hundred and sixty 
one MLAs who received the copies of the questionnaire 'cared to send. in their replies'. 
This indifference of the elected representatives of the people towardS reforming the police 
was considered 'most deplorable' by the Police Committee.161 
'This was onl.y the ·reflection of the extent of. alienation of the force from the society. But it 
was not only the pol!ce who were alienated, the Muslim League government, along with it, 
lost popular support for the misdeeds of the force. 
As was the case before political independence, people continued to look upon the police 
as representing the government.162 The 'symbol of government in the rural areas', 
according to a senior official in Bangladesh as late as 19n, 'continues to be the 
police'.163 This aspect of the relationship was highlighted by a Muslim league MLA. 
While emphasising the importance of the discipline of the force, he said that 'they (the 
Police) wiH always discredit the Government and give them a bad name, and entail a 
serious trouble for the Government' .164 An Opposition politician held the view that so far 
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as the masses were concerned the Government meant the Police and the thana which 
was the backbone of the government.165 In fact, the importance of the police force for 
the 'prestige of the government' was adequately stressed in the conference of the 
Inspectors-General of Police. While emphasising the importance of the force, the 
conference resolved that 'if the police force failed, the whole administration would fail with 
it'.166 
Thus in the true tradition of the Raj the bureaucrats and the members of the ruling elite 
relied on the force for the maintenance of 'law and order' - a shorthand for class rule. In 
the experience of the people the 'old prejudice' of linking the government and the police 
flared up every time the masses came into direct conflict with the force. As a result the 
Muslim League, as the government party, suffered continual erosion of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the people. On 23 December 1947, in a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Amir 
Ali of village Sarifganj of Mymensing district expressed bewilderment at police behaviour 
when he wrote that 'repressions of police officers are inconceivable in these days of 
democracy and popular freedom and are only reminiscent of oppression perpetrated 
duri~g the British Raj'. To this man, as to many of his compatriots, Pakistan was 
rendered meaningfess by the 'high handedness of the police·. 167 To the memorialists of 
Nawabganj in Dhaka district the police conduct 'humiliated Pakistan itself in the eye of 1he 
,people'.168 
~ In fact, as we have stated earlier, the 'notion of Pakistan' did not go well with a police 
force that had been created and bequeathed to the new nation by the Raj. Every excess 
perpetrated by the police on the people reduced the euphoria born of political 
independence. Abdullah Sharif of Jessore, in his proposed model of the state, suggested 
the abolition of the police force which he termed 'superfluous' and incompatible with the 
national government based on 'democratic ideas, and Islamic spirit'. He suggested, after 
cataloguing all the evUs of the police, conversion of the force to National Guards with the 
assurance of 'respect' for 'the voices of public opinion' .169 
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The police bureaucrats were not unaware of this fact. The Inspector-General of Police 
expressed his doubt if police officers fully realised their responsibility in the 'new set-up'. 
He reminded them that 'He who can secure the object in view by persuasion is a more 
useful officer than his comrade who relies too much on the assertion of his authority and 
thereby runs the risk of seeing that authority challenged'. The use of force, Inspector-
General of Police reminded, was always followed by complaints and recriminations which 
embittered the relations between the police and the public.170 Time and again the stress 
was laid on the persuasive power of the force by the members of the ruling party and the 
higher police bureaucrats. The Prime Minister emphasised a 'change of outlook' of the 
force. He stressed that 'unless a change could be effected in the outlook under which the 
police is to be regarded as friends, the objective to set up an ideal administration would 
not be attained' .171 He demanded initiative .from the police in this respect. 
But the initiative was lacking. The police could not free themselves from the influence of 
the Raj as was evident in the assertion of the policemen in an incident of conflict with the 
people at Cox's Bazar on 3 September 1947. While carrying on 'wanton oppression' of 
the people the police allegedly shouted: 'shalara, Pakistan has not yet been achieved, the 
British police still exist' .172 This self-image of the rank and file in the police force 
continued to finger. Most of the higher officials in the force also continued to model 
themselves on the authoritarian practice of the Raj and always guarded their colonial 
. 
heritage tenaciously. To a proposal by the Sylhet municipality for a piece of land in the 
Sylhet Sadar thana compound for erection of a memorial to shahid Alkas the Inspector-
General of Police responded by saying that it was 'undesirable to encourage the erection 
of a memorial in the Thana compound for a victim of police firing' .173 Alkas was shot by 
the police in the last days of the Raj on 24 April 1947 when a procession of the civil 
resisters proceeded towards the Sylhet Sadar police station. 'This one incident' 
according to Mahmud Ali, General Secretary of Assam Muslim League, 'was a turning 
point in the movement' to join with Pakistan.17 4 And thus Alkas became a martyr to the 
cause of Pakistan. 'In the eyes of the public it was a national cause', noted the Deputy 
Inspector-General of Police, 'and Alkas was declared to have died [the] death of [a] 
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shahid. The Deputy Inspector-General failed to see the cause of the people and thus 
isolated the police from sharing the 'glory of the cause' for which Alkas died. The gap 
between nationalist spirit and colonial rule as embodied in the coercive police continued 
to exist, though the nationalists were in control of the state. Even to a higher police 
bureaucrat it was 'extremely undesirable' to erect a memorial of a nationalist shahid in the 
compound of a police station of an independent state.175 
Thus Pakistani nationalism failed to legitimise the police force on whom it largely relied to 
build the nation and protect the state. This, along with many other factors, contributed to 
the erosion of liberalism in state practice during the years of Muslim League rule in East 
Bengal. As a result the Muslim League, the political vehicle of nation building efforts, was 
alienated from the people much sooner than many political observers had anticipated. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION: THE MUSLIM LEAGUE AND ITS RULE 
I 
In his characteristically arrogant style, Jinnah once dismissed the contribution of the 
Muslim League in achieving ·pakistan. 'Don1 talk to me. about the Muslim League,' he 
said in response to a question, 'I and my stenographer created Pakistan·1 This 
uncharitable comment came from a man who led the League with an absolute mandate 
from its members. Apart from the element of self..congratulation that it obviously 
contained, the statement also undermined the importance of the organisation, and 
slighted the sacriftce that others had made in the struggle for Pakistan. 
Recognizably an overstatement, Jinnah's remark nevertheless contained a grain of truth. 
While he had emerged as the 'sole spokesman'2 for the League and the Muslims in the 
1940s, it was also true that the League had never been a mass-based organisation in the 
~,ame.way as the Congress had been. Moreover, Pakistan's top leaders had no contact 
with the anti-colonial movement in Asia; neither did,they take part in it nor had they, as 
Kamruddin Ahmad contends, ever tried to understand it.3 As a result the league 
organisation was never steeled through participation in anti·imperialist struggles, as was 
the case with the Congress. Hence its relation with the masses was not based on 
organisational linkages; what bestowed on the League the authority to speak for Indian 
Muslims was perhaps the political context of the 1930s and 40s, and the growing 
perception of Muslims that the Hindus were their main oppressors. 
Till 1943 there was almost no provincial and district level organisation of the Muslim 
League in Bengal. 4 A branch office of the Provincial Muslim League was set up only on 9 
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April1944, at 150 Mogultooly, Dhaka.S In fact, the Dhaka District Muslim League was 
confined within the precincts of the 'Nawab Bari' (House of the Nawabs). 'Intrigues, 
faction-fights, takeover bids and knife-thrusts', in the words of Tinker, were the salient 
features of the Bengal Muslim League before independence.6 The malaise in the 
organisation of the League not only continued after independence, but deteriorated 
considerably since then, seriously affecting the district, sub-divisional and lower level 
units. There was an uneasy calm at the organizational level so long as Jinnah was alive, 
but his death on 11 September 1948, 'released forces within the League which were 
influential to limit its effectiveness, especially in East Bengal which was taking on', as 
Ziring believed, 'more and more the appearanceofapolitical battleground'7. By the time 
the League was in power in East Bengal it had developed three factions: the Dhaka or 
Nazimuddin faction, the Fazlul Huq faction and the Suhrawardy faction. The Dhaka 
faction was essentially traditional, conservative and represented by the landed 
(Zamindari) interests. The Suhrawardy faction was mostly 'modernist' in ideology and 
believed in changing the communal nature of the organisation after Pakistan was 
achieved. The Fazlul Huq faction was rural, with activists drawn from professional 
groups. The other small groups belonging to the Assam Muslim League led by Maulana 
Bhashani also added colour to the already faction-ridden East Bengal Muslim League 
politics. 
After the partition the Nazimuddin faction came to power with the blessings and with help 
from the central Muslim League leadership.8 The activists of the League were now 
divided on the issue of whether or not to open up the Muslim League to the non-Muslim 
section of the society.9 In February 1948, in the council session held at Karachi, the All 
India Muslim League was divided into two separate organisations: the Pakistan Muslim 
League and the Indian Muslim League. Except for the Muslim League parties in the 
legislature, the existing structure of the entire organisation was dissolved and all the 
primary· membership stood cancelled. Thus the reorganisation of the League involved 
fresh enrolment of primary members and the building up of the organisation from primary, 
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sub-divisional and district levels to the provincial councils, and finally the Pakistan Muslim 
League council and the working committee.1 0 
This decision to 'close the door of the League' on the face of the people was bitterly 
resented by many League activists. Abul Mansur called this action of the League a 
'political crime' entailing some ethical and moral lapses.11 The somewhat liberal criteria 
that existed before partition regarding election to various offices and organs within the 
party were now replaced by strict centralisation of directive and cautious control. This 
helped those already in control to strengthen their own positions by distributing favours to 
sections they favoured, thereby weakening oppositional groups in the organisation. It is 
not surprising that these developments gave rise to serious allegations of discrimination 
and partisan considerations within the League.12 
Organising committees at district and sub-divisional levels were nominated by Akram 
Khan, the President of the Bengal Muslim League at the time of partition, in the first week 
of May, 1948, and receipt books for enrolment of primary members were distributed to 
organisers about the same time.13 This attitude was reflected also in the way candidates 
were nominated for the District Board election held in Bogra, immediately after partition, 
where allegedly an anti-League element was given nomination by the Provincial 
leadership, overlooking 'competent' League activists.14 By July 1948, the League 
. 
organisation at the sub-divisional level and below had been constituted. The formation of 
more than one District League in a single district was reported from several districts; 
some of them accordingly had to be dissolved: in some other cases, their elections were 
declared invalid and fresh elections held. The process of reorganisation of the League 
generated serious dissatisfaction within the party ranks. Some disaffected members 
sought intervention from the central leadership, but the latter refused to overrule or by-
pass the provincial leadership in matters relating to the reorganisation of the League in 
East Bengal.15 The power of nomination of district and sub-divisional committees for 
enrolling primary members and constituting the League Committees at those levels gave 
the provincial organising committee headed by Akram Khan great scope to exercise 
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influence over the entire reorganisation process. Distribution of a meagre number of 
receipt books to these committees for enrolment purposes restricted the size of the party. 
As Nazma Chowdhury commented: 'The reorganisation policy in a way, demonstrated the 
limitations of the political style of those in power'-- their inclination toward 'coterie politics' 
rather than an open competitive style of operation.16 
The newly formed League, as lspahani observed, 'unfortunately lacked the enthusiasm, 
the determination, the discipline, the sacrifice, and above all else, the aim which propelled 
the All-India Muslim League onward to solidarity and greatness.'17 The control of the 
ruling clique over the organisation earned for the party the sobriquet 'Pocket League' from 
Maulana Bhashani. Similar criticism came from Suhrawardy who called the organisation 
a 'Sarkari League'(Government League).18 The internal crisis of the League came out 
into the open during the Council Session of the Pakistan Muslim League which was held 
at Dhaka on 18 and 19 June 1949.19 But the crisis now had reached down to most of 
the district and sub~division level organisations as well. 
Unhappy with the changes occurring within the Muslim League, a large number of 
activists left the organisation, and, on 26 June, 1949, formed the Awami Muslim League, 
the Muslim League of the people, under the leadership of Maul ana Bhashani.20 It was a 
major split, undoubtedly the biggest in the history of the Muslim League, but the party that 
survived the split failed to ensure unity and solidarity among its members and followers, 
though it was now more homogeneous than before. The old activists of the Muslim 
League held a meeting on 21st and 22nd July 1949 at the local Board Hall of north 
Sylhet. A motion of no confidence in the district and sub-divisional adhoc committees was 
passed at this meeting and communicated to them. Again on 19 August 1951 a League 
Workers' Conference was held in Sylhet, attended by many activists in the district and 
Sub-divisional branches, who expressed their sense of frustration about the provincial 
leadership. This atmosphere pervaded almost all the branches of the Muslim League all 
over the province.21 The League organisation in the province had virtually resolved itself 
into a chaotic tangle of small factions, 'each attached', as Callard has observed, 'more to 
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a person or an interest rather than representing a policy'. 'At no stage,' to quote Cal!ard 
'has the power of the politicians rested upon solid electoral support.'22 The only by-
election held in a Muslim seat in Tangail, in Mymensingh district, in April, 1949 saw the 
ruling party defeated. Their response was to postpone all other by-elections in an attempt 
to forestall any possible opposition in the assembly. The bitter experience of Tangail 
paralysed the organisation and stopped them from attempting a 'thorough overhauling of 
policy·.23 
The absence of by-elections in 34 seats, nearly one fifth of the total membership of the 
Assembly, also hampered the organisational activities of the local branches.24 
Traditionally what spurred political activities in the provinces was the mobilization around 
elections. By-elections were generally regarded as the barometer by which the ruling 
party could measure the degree of popular support they enjoyed. By postponing the 
elections the EBML deprived itself of this advantage. As a result the district and lower 
level organisations became indifferent to the public. The political result of the internecine 
factional fights and bickering for personal gain that went on inside the branches must 
have been quite frustrating for the rank and file membership. Opportunism became the 
only means of advancing one's own political status, and the MusJim League now 
developed a sycophantic political style. 
The resulting organisational problems were to become more obvious in the years that 
followed. In November 1951, for instance, four members of the Assembly from 
Chittagong resigned because of disagreement with certain government poliCies affecting 
the district. They resented the delay and the amount of the compensation fixed by the 
District Administration for the land acquired by the government in Muradpur in Chittagong 
district. It was stated that the members upheld the position of Chittagong district and city 
Muslim League regarding the issue.25 More defections and resignations took place from 
the parliamentary party after the police firing on 21 February 1952, as the League 
government failed to resolve the language issue and resorted to violence instead. Want 
of discussion within the forums of the organisation, and absence of by-elections, led to 
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serious inaction in the organisation. A 1953 Secret Report on the Organisation had this 
to say on organisational problems: 
Except in Sylhet and Noalhali Muslim League activity was hardly perceptible 
elsewhere; and there too, it was more or less of an internecine character. In Sylhet 
the League was divided into two rival groups as already reported in the previous 
fortnight, and so far no effective action has been taken by the provincial Muslim 
League to bridge this gap. In Noakhali Mr. Abdul Hakim, General Secretary of the 
DML lost the confidence of the organisation. At a specially convened meeting on 
the 19th of June a resolution of no-confidence was moved against him and was 
passed by considerable majority. The DML in Comilla is divided into 3 groups each 
pulling in a different direction. In Rangpur, the Secretary of the DML Mashiur 
Rahman and some other MLAs have joined the opposition party and at the same 
time trying to create their own party within the organisation. 
The report pointed out the 'obvious lack of discipline and cohesion' in the organisation.26 
The District Magistrate of Khulna reported to the chief Secretary the existence of two 
strong factions in the district Muslim League.27 The District Magistrate, Bansal also had 
similar reports to send to the government. The powerful 'student faction', reported the 
DM, Barisal, was 'apparently not liked at all by the older generation' who had lost power 
to them.28 'Atl the self-respecting leaders of the DML', wrote one of the 'older generation' 
leaders of Barisal, 'were under a painful necessity of keeping themselve.s aloof from the 
organisation. One coterie Muslim League was formed with some school and coUege boys 
so much so that one happened to be the secretary of the Bakherganj [Bansal} District 
Muslim League•. He further stated that 'the DML .. ;has got a woridng Committee from 
which all the MLAs were cautiously excluded' .29 In fact, the organisation became 
conspicuous by its inactivity30 at lower levels, which compelled the Working Committee 
of the DML, in its meeting of May 1949, to direct all the District, Sub-division, City and 
Union Committees to activate the organisation and to call meetings more frequently31. 
The situation prevailing in the League sometimes attracted comment from sections of the 
media sympathetic to the cause of the League. Morning News, a Dhaka daily, compared 
.tbe condition of the League to that of 'a sucked orange', and suggested that a revitalised 
Muslim League 'with less of the rulers and more of the ruled in it' could successfully 
perform the task of nation building.32 
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Many district and sub-divisional level activists were worried about the situation in the 
Party and communicated their feelings to central leaders, sometimes even to the 
Governor of the Province. The President of the Netrokona Sub-division Muslim League 
informed the Governor that 'there was no activity in the Muslim League'. He also thought 
that the provincial leaders were not sufficiently active to revitalize the organisation.33. In 
July 1951, a district level Muslim League leader informed the Governor of the Province 
that the organisation was 'not working in the villages like the Congress Party•.34. On 23 
August 1951, Mahmud Ali, the former General Secretary of Assam Muslim League, wrote 
in Naobelal that in the last four years there had been no Muslim League activity.in Sylhet. 
The Convenor of Sylhet ML Adhoc Committee, Myenuddin Ahmad Chowdhury, also 
resented the gross inactivity of the organisation in the district.35 'To many in the country', 
as Smith has observed, 'the leaders have seemed, in fact, to have clung to power but to 
have abdicated leadership' .36 Many supporters of the League were pained to see the 
condition of their organisation, and expressed their frustration through the media. ln a 
letter to the editor of the MOrning News, one· Akhtar Hossain Joarder of Rajshahi wrote on 
17 September 1952 that 'the masses are estranged [from the League] and as such when 
any public meeting is held the present leaders do not get any audience. We have got 
League leaders and League Government', he wrote further, 'but no League minded 
people'37 Even Akram Khan, the President of the PML, admitted in his letter of 
·J:e$.igq~tion before tf'l~ June 19~9 Council Session that the popularity of the League was 
'waning rapidly', and people were losing faith in the national organisation. He blamed the 
'internal weakness of the organisation' for the unhappy situation of the Muslim League.38 
'Internal weakness' was a major reason why no party elections were held after the 
reorganisation process in 1948. The' elections which were scheduled in 1951 started 
taking place towards the end of the year; and this opened a pandora's box of internal 
conflicts. In some districts and sub-divisions 'parallel Leagues' were formed, so that more 
than one League executive body was elected. But elections could not be completed in 
Sylhet, Narayanganj city, Barisal, Rangpur, Rajshahi, Khulna, Comilla, and Dhaka city in 




situation. 'The factional struggles in the lower units of the organisation'. Nazma 
Chowdhury has rightly observed, 'reflected the factional conflicts which prevailed in the 
upper echelons of party leadership.'40 Deep fissures had now been created in the party; 
conflicts of personality and power overshadowed the members' allegiance to the 
organisation. 41 To some extent the state of the party can be assessed from a comment 
by Ananda Bazar Patrika on 20 June 1953: 'The Muslim League which took the reins of 
Government is now crumbling to pieces. There is no powerful and popular person in its 
ranks who may solve its internal problem. An institution which is busy about settling its 
own house in order cannot possibly rule the country in a proper way. In this circumstance 
the interest of the masses are bound to suffer.'42 
This lack of a mass base was pointed out by the DM, Khulna, in a Fortnightly Report to 
the Government on 26 October 1949. According to him mass contact was a thing which 
was dreaded by the district leadership, and thus no attempt at enrolment of members was 
being made.43 As a result 'instead of controlling and directing the party', the leadership 
did considerable damage to the organisation and lost touch with the people. 
The legislative wing of the ML was similarly affected. The general climate of League 
politics made many of the legislators unresponsive to the expectations of the people. In 
previous . ch~pters we · have given a number of instances of Muslim League MLAs 
criticising, from time to time, various government policies, in order to make those more 
pro-people. But most of the time their criticism went unheeded. Some members harped 
on the bureaucratic nature of the government which, they felt, ~esembled more the Raj 
than 'national' government. Failing to reform the organisation and the Government, some 
of them defected and formed the Awami League Group in the provincial Assembly in 
February 1952. But most of the League MLAs were seemingly engaged in furthering their 
own personal ends and the interests of the class they represented. For these activities, 
they depended more on the civil servants than on the people, 'from whom their roots had 
been cut off', giving the bureaucrats an opportunity to establish their supremacy in the 




clearly from the following observation in the East Pakistan Police Committee report: 'Of 
late, the use of armed police has been considerable as the security measures specially 
with regard to the Members of the Central and Provincial Government have been 
intensified'.45 By now a significant number of the Muslim League leaders had given up 
their idea of 'Pakistan Revolution' in exchange for bureaucratic and police protection. 
II 
All the key posts~ including those of Secretaries of the East Bengal Secretariat, went to 
non-Bengalis after independence. There was only one Benga1i46 among the 82 senior 
officers who opted for Pakistan. Kamruddin Ahmad, a contemporary political activist, 
observed that the bureaucrats in Pakistan were not only responsible for executing the 
policy of the government, but also took upon themselves the task of framing the policy.47 
Ziring was even more eloquent in emphasising the importance of the bureaucracy in 
Pakistan. The East Bengal civil servants, drawn mostly from the Punjab, who knew little 
about the economic, social and cultural problems of the country,48 owed their allegiance 
only to the central executive. 'Behind the facade of the cabinet, stood these permanent 
Civil Servants, tirelessly and ceaselessly advising the individual ministers as regards 
legislaticm and other matters'. In this way, Ziring went on t<~ emphasise, 'the Civil 
Servants matured virtually an government proposals, both executive and legislative. 49 
Thus the situation was one where the bureaucracy remained the predominant factor in 
the political processes of the province. It is in this context that one can perhaps 
appreciate the significance of the Morning News editorial on 12 August 1950, in which 
Mafizuddin Ahmed, East Pakistan's Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, was applauded 
for setting 'a courageous example' by holding a Press conference at Dhaka instead of 
allowing a Permanent Secretary to do the job, as had been the practice in the province. 
"" The editorial also exhorted the Minister 'to see that no infringement of their powers and 
privileges takes place'. It hailed 'the example' as worth emulating by other Ministers.SO 
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The provincial bureaucracy was run by a Chief Secretary, an ethnic Punjabi, on whom 
most of the members of the cabinet, including the Prime Minister were dependent. The 
Prime Minister also indirectly enhanced the prestige and influence of the Divisional 
Commissioners by arrogating to himself the Cabinet's power of rejection of any 
suggestion from the former regarding issues of governance.51 Kamruddin Ahmad 
thought that the Chief Minister of East Pakistan 'lacked personality', and that was why he 
failed to control the bureaucracy.52 Umar has also highlighted interesting examples to 
show how it was the Chief Secretary who took most of his important decisions on issues 
like the Language controversy in the province.53 Talking to Aziz Ahmed, the Chief 
Secretary of the province, Taya Zinkin had a feeling that 'his whole attitude was that of a 
colonial administrator. ·54 
Zinkin also reports that at the mention of the Chief Minister, Nurul Amin, Aziz Ahmed 
said, 'what can you expect of him? He is an ass and a Bengali.' 55 If this was the attitude 
of the Chief Secretary to the Chief Minister, which he unhesitatingly expressed to a 
representative of a foreign press, one can only imagine how less important Muslim 
League ministers would have fared in the eyes of the bureaucracy. Kamruddin Ahmad 
quotes Aziz Ahmed as saying 'I am the Government', and the media also from time to 
time confirmed the self-image of the Chief Secretary in the provincial administration. 56 In 
fact, there are innumerable instances of the Chief Secretary reprimanding Ministers in the 
course of the day to day running of administration. The situation reached such an absurd 
state as to make Kamruddin Ahmad wonder who, between Nurul Amin and Aziz Ahmed, 
was responsible for the failure of democracy in East Pakistan. 57 
What was happening at the Provincial headquarters of the administration influenced the 
lower levels of the bureaucracy as well. In the June 1949 Council Session of the ML 
many councillors complained to their .leaders about the 'insults' the District Magistrates 
and other officers used to hurl at the League members of the districts.58 But the 'insults' 
continued almost without interruption from bureaucratic quarters. In a Memorandum on 
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20 March 1950, submitted to the Prime Minister on behalf of the Sylhet district Muslim 
Students' Association, the' memorialists complained against the 'unbecoming and 
humiliating behaviour of the OM' towards Qazi Muhibur Rahman, a former councillor of 
the Assam Provincial Muslim League. The OM had the former arrested 'on personal 
grounds' allegedly to satisfy his vanity. 'It was too strong a shock for him (Qazi Muhibur 
Rahman) to stand' and as a result he fell ill inside the jail and later died.59 The reason 
for this 'excess', as stated by the memorialists, was that Muhibur Rahman had dared to 
speak against the OM to the Divisional Commissioner. Complaints also came in from the 
sub-divisions. The DML Secretary of Rangpur complained to the OM about 'a concrete 
case of an arrogant Government official [SDO, Nilphamari] who always undermined the 
prestige of the National Organisation.' Commenting on the complaint,even the Chief 
Secretary disapproved of the tactless manner in which the officer behaved towards the 
ML activists in the sub-division.60 
In May 1949, the Working Committee in its meeting entreated the Government servants 
to be 'courteous' and 'helpful' to the citizens. The Prime Minister, in the first conference 
of the Commissioners, emphasised the need for politeness and sympathy in their 
dealings with others. And he assigned the officers the role of 'guides and friends' to the 
public.61 In fact the OMS acted more as guides than as friends to the League. In their 
Fortnightly Reports they almost regularly appraised and suggested ways to improve the 
performance of the League branches in the districts. In one such report the District 
Magistrate of Khulna wrote: 'It is time that the Provincial Muslim League thought (sic) 
seriously of the future of Muslim League Organisation in the district. It is in the hands of 
people who are not anxious to maintain the prestige and sustain the popularity of the 
organisation in the district'. He also suggested a role for the Provincial Leaders in the 
Report: 'Some provincial League officials should make mass contact and find out the 
weakness existing at the moment in the working of the present organisation and the 
impediments ·that are standing in the way of making the League a really powerful 
democratic body in the district'. The reason for concern was also spelt out by the OM 
who preferred this recommendation for 'the interest of not only the local administration 
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but in the ultimate good of the dumb nuts masses of the district'. 62 The elitist attitude 
expressed in this statement is too obvious to require any comment. 
m 
The demand for restructuring the bureaucracy had been articulated since the birth of the 
new nation. As early as September 1947, an important resolution was adopted in the 
East Pakistan Youth Conference held at Dhaka on 26 September. It stated that activists 
who had made sacrifices in the struggle for Pakistan, and all those who had deeprooted 
connections with the soil, were to be recruited to the bureaucracy. For many activists, of 
course, liberty against foreign rule symbolized the absence of colonial state functionaries, 
or at least assumption of effective control over them. On 18 November 1947, the 
speakers in a meeting organised by the Muslim League at the local Muslim Institute, 
Mymensingh, expressed the opinion that the public should be at liberty to remove any 
Minister or official whom they thought 'dishonest and inefficient'.63 The demand for 
popular control over the bureaucracy was articulated more strongly and regularly by the 
relatively lower level activists of the League, and their supporters. As early as January 
1948, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Naimuddin Ahmed criticised the bureaucracy as 
'British created. agents' of oppression in a leaf.let. They demanded trimming of the top 
heavy bureaucracy, by abolishing the useless posts of divisional commissioners, deputy 
secretaries, joint secretaries, aid-de-camp of the Prime Minister and Parliamentary 
secretaries, for all these incurred heavy drain on the exchequer. They asked for direct 
contact between the secretaries and the people, and demanded that the participants in 
the struggle for Pakistan take control of all aspects of life in the new nation. 64 A number 
of elected representatives in the Assembly were in favour of abolition of 'old relation 
between officers and the public'. 'The Raja-Praja (King-Subject) relationship', remarked 
an MLA, 'would not exist any longer.' There was now an expectation of exchange of 
'heart and mind' between officers and the people.65 This sentiment was reiterated by 
members of the Assembly who failed to notice 'any change of outlook of the officials'; to 
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them, they, the officers appeared to be the same as they were during the Raj.66 Their 
'superiority complex and vanity', nurtured during British rule, were 'abundantly exhibited', 
some members thought, when officers came in contact with the people. Quite often 
people were 'slighted and neglected'.67 Mohammed Owais, a Muslim League MLA, 
criticised the officers on a number of occasions, and urged them to accept the fact that 
they were only public servants•68 But to most of the League MLAs reform of bureaucracy 
essentially meant some kind of a new relation between the officers and the people. 
Members suggested reforms to help 'change the outlook of officials, if necessary, by 
arranging 'training classes' in order to make the latter suitable to serve a Representative 
Government. 69 
Criticism of officials from outside the Assembly was more in the form of demanding 
disciplinary measures against them than anything else. A public meeting at 
Govindacharan Park in Sylhet, on 19 November 1947, presided over by the Secretary of 
the Assam Muslim League, demanded the 'immediate removal' of the Deputy 
Commissioner for his alleged 'highandedness and nepotism'. Such public demands for 
disciplinary measures against officials were a feature of the early years of post·colonial 
history . 
. A qlirnact;ic. point .in the contest between ML activists and the bureaucracy, often 
represented by district Magi$tra.tes,·was reached when a controversy broke out in Barisal, 
on the issue of selecting a president for a meeting scheduled to celebrate the first year of 
independence on 14 August 1948. The local League members wanted their president to 
have this honour, while the OM secretly sent off a telegram asking for CS's permission to 
preside over the meeting. 'To satisfy League izzat (Prestige},' wrote the OM, Barisal, to 
the Chief Secretary, 'I agreed to ascertain your opinion on the subject•.70 To the OM 'it 
was a childish matter', but to many League activists this symbolic act.af having the 
League President preside over Independence Day meetings· was a proof of the 
superiority of the organisation over the bureaucracy. Abul Mansur Ahmad, in his 
autobiography, recatled similar conflicts in Mymensingh.71 
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Access to state power made some League activists believe that they had a right to 
control the state machinery. The District Magistrate of Khulna reported that the League 
leaders of the district approached the Superintendent of Police and asked him to obey the 
'unwritten law' that all cases of transfer and promotion of officers would have to be 
decided according to the wishes of the Muslim League.72 However, the District 
Administration had learnt to neutralise such pressures from the League. The Police 
Committee observed that 'MLAs do approach District Officers but the latter are able to 
withstand the influence'. The Committee thought that it was 'a breach of discipline' and 
'gross violation of the principle of good and just government' even if a Minister of 
Government sent for an officer of a District. 73 
Gradually the urge for popular control over the bureaucracy was eroded, as bureau9ratic 
control over the political process increased. The ML activists soon found that their only 
recourse in the face of bureaucratic intransigence was the 'parliament of the street'. 
When the earlier mentioned SDO of Nilphamari did not cooperate with the sub-divisional 
Muslim League in distributing relief money on 19 December 1952, a 'huge procession· 
demanding enquiry against the SDO was staged by the League workers; and 
subsequently a 'complete hartal' was observed, demanding the resignation of the SD0.74 
When popular resentment was vented against officers the Government protected them; it 
was thought inexpedient to punish officers, as it could affect the 'morale and prestige of 
the service:75 Most of the time the officers were defended and protected by the 
Ministers, and not infrequently by the Prime Minister, who thought that 'the Government 
and the people were one·.76 In fact, the League Government was very much dependent 
on the officers for administration of the country. This was partly due to the contribution of 
the latter to strengthening the League by securing Government support during the Raj in 
many 'devious ways' and partly because the League accepted the officer's image of 
themselves as 'intellectually and morally superior to the politicians'.77 
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The Prime Minister used to yield too easily to all claims of 'superiority' on the part of the 
bureaucrats. He also credited the successful organisation and establishment of a stable 
government in the somewhat 'trying and strenuous condition' to a large extent to the 
untiring efforts and zeal of officers in charge of district administration.78 This was not 
merely an expression of gratitude of a complacent Prime Minister towards the members 
of the civil service, it was also an admission of the reality of the power relations that 
existed between the executive and the politicians of the League. 
IV 
In our attempt to understand the reasons for the decline of the Muslim League in East 
Pakistan, we have explored the less familiar side of early East Pakistan history. We 
have focused particularly on the process of transition to a post-colonial polity, by 
· highlighting the relationships of various sections of the peasantry with the Muslim League 
and the Governmental bureaucracy in East Bengal. 
The post-colonial political order in East Bengal was born with congenital defects that 
flawed all attempts at transition to a democracy. The most important instrument of this 
transition, the Muslim League, was wanting, as we already know, in organisational 
strength, and in its formal organisational linkages with the masses. Its particular history 
did not contain a tradition of mass struggle against the Raj. However, many activists of 
the League took initiatives to expand and strengthen the base of popular support, by 
espousing the cause of the people. But the League leaders in the government failed to 
take up the hegemonic task of broadening the scope of alliances with the masses, by 
including them in the process of making and implementing decisions that were critical to 
the development of democracy and nationhood. National unity could only sustain itself 
through voluntary participation of its constituent elements; thus the limits to participation 
were a sure source of decay of the Muslim League and democratic government. In order 
to ensure continued participation of the rural masses in land reform, water management 
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and in food procurement and distribution, beyond the immediate contingencies like 
natural disasters,it was necessary that the benefits were clearly perceived by the 
people. But due to the dominance of vested interests within the League79 and the 
presence of an 'overdeveloped' bureaucracy in the state,80 the League failed to 
encourage such initiatives from lower level activists and sections of the peasantry of East 
Bengal. 
Over time, the bureaucratic hold over planning, organising and executing nation-building 
projects strengthened. Use was made of acts, rules, circulars, and orders framed by the 
British Government to centralise powers in the hands of the bureaucracy. Even fresh 
ordinances curbing freedom of association and speech were issued on the pretext of 
national security.81 At lower levels, the district bureaucracy continued to retain 
monopolistic control over all fundamental institutions and processes of decision making, 
as before. Thus, in the East Bengal political system, the Government led by the Muslim 
League failed to impinge on the administrative system forcefully enough to foster an 
atmosphere of democratic participation in all spheres of nation-building. The Muslim 
League rule saw instead a shift of power and authority in the favour of the civil service, 
already notorious for its abuse of power, its incompetence and corruption. 
Being disgruntled with such administration both at the district and provincial level, many 
party activists dissociated themselves from the party and launched strong criticism 
against the government in various public forums. Quite understandably, zulum and 
corruption of officers are major themes in this critique, informed by juridical notions of 
power and contract in public affairs, which drew their legitimacy from the parliamentary 
democratic traditions of the British in their own country, and, philosophically, from the 
Enlightenment tradition of Europe. But this process revealed the helplessness of the 
liberal elements of the League before the wielder of real power, the bureaucrats. 
Tragically, the politicians were now reduced only to a role of brokers between the people 
on the one side, and the state on the other. In the end the activists of the League, 
including those in the Government, were forced to realise that even a petty official in the 
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'steel frame' was somebody they had to kowtow to for favour. To a certain extent this 
explains the ambiguity inherent in the relationship between officials and the people, a 
point we have discussed in chapter 4. Ziring observed that the people displayed little 
confidence in 'their representatives' and their experience taught them to look to other 
authority when their welfare was threatened.82 In December 1951 the Governor of the 
Province, in his tour diary, also noted this aspect of the people's behaviour towards 'office 
holders of political organisation'. He mentioned that the people had more confidence in 
public servants than in elected representatives.83 For this, the politics of the League had 
a lot to answer for. Instead of politicising issues concerning the 'welfare' of the people, 
the League activists started influencing and relying on public servants for distribution of 
the resources of the government of East Pakistan. 
Gradually a situation developed when the ML was subject to the pull of two contrary 
forces: one of bureaucracy, that drew together a certain number of League politicians, 
especially those in the Government, often described as the 'Sarkari Dal' (Government's 
Party); and the other, of the activists who failed to make the League a mass based 
democratic organisation and felt frustrated at this failure. Whatever contact that was 
established between the people and the League in the preindependence period lingered 
on with the splitaway section of the League, now mobilized mostly under the banner of 
the Aw~mi League (or People's League). By 1954 the point had been reached, to borrow 
from Gramsci, when the social classes became detached from their party in that 
particular form, with the particular men who represented and led them.84 The Muslim 
League was no longer recognised by these classes as their representative party any 
more. 
As a result the Muslim League was rejected totally in the election of March 1954. But the 
dream and expectation which inspired large numbers of Muslim peasants of East Bengal 
and the middle class to rally round the demand for their 'holy land' remained unfulfilled. 
For many people, democratic participation in the affairs of the nation began and ended at 
the ballot-box. The victory at the polls turned out to be a defeat of the political party only. 
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The functionaries of the State managed to remain above the control of the elected 
representatives, and democratic checks on the former's increasing tendency to arrogate 
power to themselves proved to be lacking in force and authority.85 
Through an elaborate and well contrived conspiracy, the rule of the bureaucracy 
continued till the ruling clique in Karachi decided to change the form of rule by imposing 
Martial Law on 7 October, 1958. The saga of a democratic form of state had come to an 
end by then. Never again could the Awami League make a comeback and consolidate 
political power, at least not within the framework of Pakistan. Even in Bangladesh, the 
new nation-state was relinquished too soon to the fold of the civil military bureaucracy. 
This time it took even less than 4 years for the bureaucracy to do away with the political 
system advocated by the Awami League. Ever since then, they have been in control of 
the political process in Bangladesh. In analysing the regression in Bangladesh politics 
after the Military takeover in August 1975, one cannot but be reminded of Marx's 
excellent comment in the Eighteenth Brumaire, 'Instead of society having conquered a 
new content for itself, it seems that the State only returned to its oldest form, to the 
shamelessly simple domination of the sabre and the cowl'.86 
And in this process the political parties have been reduced to a position of helpless 
onlookers in the affairs of the state, only to be occasionally shocked to attention by the 
routine upsurge of the masses, claiming, usually unsuccessfully ,their right to participate 
in the organization of their own fives and dreams. 
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Main paddy crop sown during rainy season and harvested during 
beginning of dry season. 
One-sixteenth part of a rupee. 
Foodgiver. 
Helper, Civil Armed Guard. 
Coarse flour. 
Paddy sown in early rain and harvested during rainy season. 
Muslim call for prayer. 
Competition 
SeeAdhiar. 








About one third acre. 
Paddy grown in dry season. 











Daroga Police sub-inspector. 
Dawal Reaper, seasonal migratory agricultural. labour. 
Dhankarari See tanka 
Dharma Moral code, religion. 
Durbikhkha Famine 
Elaka Area 
Gantidar See Adhiar. 
Goonda Ruffian. 
Hajot Pollee lock-up. 
Haor Large swamp. 
Hart a/ Strike. 
Hat Periodic market. 
Hizrat Migration. 
ld Muslim religious festival. 
lzzat Prestige, honour. 
Jatha Spear. 
Jhanda Flag. 
Jotedar Stratum next to land lord and quasi-land lord. 
JulurrtZulum Oppression 





































Fishing implement similar to forked spear. 
Peasant. 




Literally mother and father; indicates dependency relationship. 
Insignificant, Ordinary. 
Mansion. 
Village faction leader. 
Religious teacher. 
Muslim congregation chanting praise for Prophet Muhammad. 




One who participates in religious war. 
Religious leader. 
Muslim. 





Bell shaped fish trap to catch fish in shallow water. 
Person who catches fish with a polo. 
Provincial. 
Folk poem. 























Relating to wedding. 
2.0571b.; nearly a kilogram. 
Martyr. 
Uterally wife's younger brothers; often used as a term of abuse 




Land lord or tenure holder; usually collector of rent from raiyats. 
Fixed-rent in kind in some areas of Mymensingh. 
Who pays tanka. 
See Sulfi. 
Basic revenue collection unit. 
Loop. 
Rural police station. 
Assembly where religious speeches are delivered. 
The annual payment of one-fortieth of a Muslim's total assets as 
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